2009, Conference of European Churches

Report on the 13th Assembly of the Conference of European Churches, Lyon, 15-21 July 2009

Report on the 13th Assembly of the Conference of European Churches,
Lyon, 15-21 July 2009

Andrew Bowden

The assembly celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Conference of European Churches (CEC). There were a lot of people there! From the British Isles, the Bishops of London, Guildford and Dublin among others. The Orthodox Churches were very fully represented, with the exception of Russian Orthodox who have (temporarily we hope) withdrawn. A large Nordic-Baltic group, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, Italy and everywhere else too. And a lot of hangers-on like us! English, German and French languages were all used, and there was simultaneous translation via headphones available.

Besides the key-note addresses there were ‘hearings’ – smaller groups addressed by an expert on a special theme, there was group work, and there were sessions on CEC business matters. There was an ‘Agora’ consisting of ten or more stalls set up by interested groups. Orthodox groups from Cyprus, Albania, Greece and Czech Republic were very prominent.

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2009, Ireland

Ireland and the EU: Gift Horse or Trojan Horse?

Ireland and the EU: Gift Horse or Trojan Horse?

Simon Usherwood

Both the Republic of Ireland and the EU have changed since Irish accession in 1973, and as a result Irish acceptance of continuing integration has become more conditional.

Ireland’s increasingly contested relationship with the EU is partly a result of the success of the Irish economy in modernising and reinventing itself, which in turn has helped to make it more like other European states, economically, politically and socially. In the same manner as the Germans, the Irish people have become aware, and assertive, of their interests in the integration process, which has led to something of a popular backlash against the elite consensus on the value of EU membership. Every country thinks of itself as special, and Ireland is no exception. Historical factors making Ireland special are: its relationship to the UK; the fact that historically it has been a site of emigration and relative underdevelopment; its particular political system (with political parties that do not fit into typical classifications); and its neutrality.

Irish EU membership came about as a consequence of its links with the UK, but has resulted in its emancipation from the UK and its linkage with a new source of modernisation, especially after Mediterranean enlargement (the enlargements to Greece (1981) and to Spain and Portugal (1987) were important in making the EU much more active in regional development, from which Ireland benefited extensively). There are thus historically positive associations between EU membership and modernisation, with EU Development Funds as a key driver of this modernisation (although Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and internal growth reinforcement (the focus on infrastructure development for domestic economic actors to expand further) played an important role alongside EU funding).

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2009, Ireland

Ireland and the EU after the Lisbon Treaty Referendum

Ireland and the EU after the Lisbon Treaty Referendum

Brigid Laffan

This is a critical juncture in Ireland’s relations with the EU. The decisions that will be taken by the Irish government, parliament, potentially the courts, and the Irish electorate are likely to have a lasting impact on Ireland’s relations with the EU and its member states.

Ireland in the Union

There is a tension and juxtaposition between how Ireland has positioned itself and is perceived in the Union (the Brussels game) and how the Irish public perceive EU membership (the domestic game).

From the outset, Ireland positioned itself as a state committed to EU integration in contrast to the UK in particular. The titles ‘good European’ and ‘model pupil’ were assigned to Ireland in the discourse on EU membership at least until the first referendum on the Nice Treaty in 2001.

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2009, Ireland

Why did Ireland Reject the Lisbon Treaty in 2008

Why did Ireland Reject the Lisbon Treaty in 2008

John Fitzgibbon

The Irish referendum on 12 June 2008 rejecting the Lisbon Treaty has produced substantial research and comment. Using in-depth post-referendum voter analysis the major conclusions drawn in the literature are that Irish voters voted No simply because they did not understand the Treaty or were opposed to specific EU policies that were and were not included in the Treaty.

While I do not question the validity of this research, I want to place these factors in a wider context. Since the rejection of the first Nice Treaty in 2001, there has been confusion as to how the Irish electorate can remain overwhelmingly positive toward EU integration yet reject two EU treaties. In this paper I argue that while the individual factors behind the Lisbon rejection discussed in previous research on Lisbon are relevant, the phenomenon of organised civil society opposition to European integration and the inherent instability of political party based pro-EU referendum campaigns provide a more incisive analysis of the increasing trend of Irish Euroscepticism.

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2009, Russia

Russia: its Current Political and Economic Situation and its Geopolitical Position, including its Position on the EU

Russia: its Current Political and Economic Situation and its Geopolitical Position, including its Position on the EU

Edwin Bacon

The unofficial term for the partnership between Medvedev (President) and Putin (Prime Minister) is ‘Tandemocracy’. Medvedev has worked for Putin for 15 years and regards him as an elder brother. Putin has always defended the Constitution and the form of democracy as developed in Russia. Putin is also head of the United Russia party, which is by far the biggest party in the Duma, so if Medvedev tried to sack him the Duma would probably object.

I think Putin sees himself as a transitional figure whose task is to bring stability to Russia after a Time of Troubles, and he envisages that that he will give way to a more democratic younger generation. Hence he chose Medvedev, who was the most liberal of the possible choices. But Putin has a Plan B: if everything goes wrong he will come back and wield a firm hand again.

Medvedev and Putin think basically alike, but probably differ over their perspectives on the future: Medvedev has set up a think tank which is now espousing a more liberal line than the Putin camp. In the current economic crunch the Putin camp is arguing for more state intervention, protection for workers and so on, but the Medvedev camp is arguing that the bargain reached under the Putin presidency, when people put up with the curtailment of civil liberties in return for economic growth, should now be modified in the direction of more civil liberties.

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2009, Kosovo

Kosovo: the Role of Religion in the Current Situation

Kosovo: the Role of Religion in the Current Situation

Daut Dauti

What are the dynamics of religions in Kosovo today? In communist Yugoslavia there was a liberal religious policy compared to that of other communist countries, but religion didn’t play any role in society. Religion gave a flavour to the Kosovo war of 1998-99, but it wasn’t a defining factor. The Kosovo Liberation Army tried to keep religion out of the agenda because they had seen what had happened in the earlier wars involving Croatia and Bosnia. This was an outcome of their coming later into armed conflict. We should remember that Albanians were always historically divided among three faiths, without any strife among them. But since the war religion has been growing as a factor. Now Wahhabis (Muslim fundamentalists), with financial backing from Saudi Arabia, are trying to gain converts among Kosovans. Mosques are being built by Wahhabis, huge, in Saudi style, but in places where people don’t use them. Traditional Islam in Kosovo, influenced by the Bektashi Sufi movement, is very liberal: few hijabs are to be seen, and alcohol is available; there are a few minarets, but no visible signs of religion. One specialist observes that Kosovans practise Islam but think like Europeans. When Wahhabis arrive and say ‘you can’t be Muslims like this’ the Kosovans say ‘yes we can, we’ve been like this for 600 years’. Lord Byron said Greeks don’t recognise Albanians as Christians, but the Turks don’t recognise them as Muslims either. Bektashis are despised by Wahhabis for their liberalism, including their equal treatment of men and women. In Tetovo in 2007 a Bektashi house was seized by force by Wahhabis armed with Kalashnikovs. But, to repeat, this religious intolerance has developed since the war of the 1990s, especially since 1999. At the same time considerable numbers of people have been turning to neo-Protestantism and New Religious Movements. The religion which is losing ground in Kosovo is traditional Islam.

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2009, Kosovo

Kosovo: the Background and Current Situation

Kosovo: the Background and Current Situation

Rigels Halili

The crucial date for understanding the Kosovo situation is not in medieval times but 1878. By the 1870s the Ottoman Empire was clearly disintegrating, and the Eastern Question was high on the agenda of the western powers, including prominently Great Britain. Although the origins of Albanian nationalism can be traced back a few decades earlier, it was only during the 1860s and 1870s that Albanian intellectuals made clear demands on a nationalistic basis. The Albanians were afraid that they would lose their Albanian-populated lands to the other emerging Balkan states. Albanian leaders formed the League of Prizren in 1878 to press for territorial autonomy and integrity.

Kosovo and Northern Albania were in the main focus of the Albanian nationalist movement during the second half of the nineteenth century because they were under threat from the territorial aspirations of Serbia and Montenegro. Serbia’s aspirations towards Bosnia and Herzegovina were thwarted by the Austrian annexation of that province in October 1908, and the Serbs then focused their attention on Kosovo for expansion. In the First Balkan War (1912-13) Serbia, Montenegro and Greece laid claim to Albanian lands, and the Albanians declared independence. In 1913 the conference of ambassadors of the Great Powers in London granted Kosovo to Serbia and Çameria to Greece. In Serbia proper this was seen as the liberation of Kosovo from the Muslims. From that time Albanians in Kosovo, who were treated as Muslims, were encouraged to leave.

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